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Abstract—Federated learning (FL) has recently emerged as a
new form of collaborative machine learning, where a common
model can be learned while keeping all the training data on local
devices. Although it is designed for enhancing the data privacy,
we demonstrated in this paper a new direction in inference
attacks in the context of FL, where valuable information about
training data can be obtained by adversaries with very limited
power. In particular, we proposed three new types of attacks to
exploit this vulnerability. The first type of attack, Class Sniffing,
can detect whether a certain label appears in training. The other
two types of attacks can determine the quantity of each label, i.e.,
Quantity Inference attack determines the composition proportion
of the training label owned by the selected clients in a single
round, while Whole Determination attack determines that of the
whole training process. We evaluated our attacks on a variety of
tasks and datasets with different settings, and the corresponding
results showed that our attacks work well generally. Finally, we
analyzed the impact of major hyper-parameters to our attacks
and discussed possible defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of federated learning (FL) enables multiple
devices to learn a common model while keeping all the
training data on their own devices. It allows for less resource
consumption on the cloud and ensures the privacy at the
same time. Multiple applications have benefited from FL,
including mobile phones [1, 2, 3], wearable devices [4, 5],
autonomous vehicles [6, 7], etc. In standard federated learning,
all participants are required to train their local models. A
random subset of clients will be selected each round, who will
upload their gradient updates to the central server. Similar FL
architectures can be found in [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
One interesting question here is about the security and pri-
vacy implication in the FL training process. Any characteristic
of clients’ private data needs to be protected carefully since
it may reveal some important private information about the
training data – e.g., the distribution of labels might show
the diversity of participants. Similarly, what the training data
consists of is also what attackers want to explore, i.e., can
they determine the quantity proportion of different labels in
the whole training dataset during the training process? This
problem may pose serious threats to FL security. For instance,
an attacker can acquire information about the morbidity of
a particular disease if the government is training an online
disease diagnosis system. A malicious store can figure out the
relation between the supply and demand of a certain product
when there is a new commodity registration system trained
with FL approach, and it can then adjust its price accordingly
to gain unfair advantage.
In the literature, there are mainly two areas of research
on attacking FL models: division and aggregation, which
correspond to the two main roles in FL (distributed devices
and central server). The former one assumes that the at-
tacker compromises some participated devices and uses them
to achieve malicious intentions, e.g. importing backdoor to
FL [14, 15], adversarial poisoning [16, 17, 18], membership
or property inference [19, 20, 21, 22], and reconstruction
attack [23, 24, 25]. The attacks in the latter area are relatively
less-studied. In [26], the authors assume that the central server
is malicious and train a GAN to reproduce data samples similar
to the privacy of clients. Similar idea can also be seen in [27].
Please see Section VI for a more comprehensive discussion
on related works.
These previously-studied attacks to FL, e.g., membership
inference or reconstruction attack, did not lay much emphasis
on the quantity information in training, as they usually focus
on existential information, i.e., whether a certain sample exists
in training data. Another drawback of these approaches is that
they all need individual updates that clients sent to the server.
However, under the secure aggregation protocol [28] or dif-
ferential privacy techniques [29, 30], both the participants and
the server cannot acquire the individual updates in the plain
form, which make most of these attacks difficult. Therefore,
more practical and applicable attacks should be based on the
assumption that the observation of individual updates is not
available.
The aforementioned issues motivated us to consider attacks
without asking individual updates. In this paper, we propose
three new inference attacks with high success rate and without
the need of any gradient updates from individual clients. In
addition, our attacks concentrate on the quantity information of
training data in FL, which could lead to serious consequences
but has never been studied in prior works to the best of our
knowledge. We conducted extensive experiments to evaluate
the effectiveness and generality of our approaches, and the
results showed the existence of vulnerability from quantity
privacy leakage.
Our contributions. In this paper, we make the first step
towards quantity estimation attacks in federated learning.
Specifically:
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• We propose a new attacking surface in the context of
federated learning, i.e., inferring the quantity composition
proportion of different labels in the training process. For
instance, an attacker may learn how many data samples
with each label are used in the training of a certain
learning model, which may possibly pose considerable
privacy threats to the practical application of FL.
• We design three general attacks towards FL without the
need to observe any individual updates. This enables the
adversaries to launch our attacks successfully in FL even
with secure aggregation protocols or under the protection
of differential privacy. Our attacks are passive, which
means they will not impose any influence to the training
process, and thus they can work covertly without being
detected by many intrusion detection techniques.
• Our technique can infer the labels’ quantity composition
proportion of a single training round, or the whole
training process. The former aims at stealing the quantity
information of the training data owned by selected clients,
while the latter one targets the quantity proportion of all
participants at different training stages.
II. THREAT MODEL
A. Problem
The advancement of deep learning techniques has received
significant interests in recent years. It also has a wide range
of applications on different types of devices, which gives a
bright stage for FL to show its merits on convenience, privacy
protection and resource utilization. In fact, FL has shown great
promises not only on smartphone-based applications (e.g.,
human activity recognition [1], heart rate monitoring [4] and
keyboard prediction [2, 3]), but also in other fields, such as
healthcare industry (e.g., disease diagnosis online expert sys-
tem and medical insurance registration [31]) and transportation
systems (vehicular networking technology [6, 7]).
FL is designed to preserve the private data of individuals,
and any information or characteristic should be protected
seriously. In FL architecture, training data owned by clients
comes from various sources, so the quantity of samples among
different labels might be unbalanced, which reflects the clients’
overall characteristic. It is a potential source of information
leakage if these quantities are illegally obtained by malicious
attackers. For instance, an organization wants to build up an
online disease prediction system with FL structure among
thousands of hospitals. Each hospital trains their local model
with their own data, and the organization will obtain a global
model that is able to predict the trend of many diseases, not
just a small group of diseases emerged in a single hospital.
Then, there is a malicious player who wants to know how
many hospitals have treated a particular disease, so that it can
raise the corresponding treatment expenses and even estimate
the approximate distribution scope of this disease. This is a
simple example of attackers may try to learn the composition
proportion of training data for their advantage, and many other
applications could have similar concern.
Thus, in this work, the goal of attackers is defined as to
infer the quantity information of particular training labels,
especially the composition proportion of training labels in
a single training round and the whole training process.
B. Assumptions
Unlike prior inference attack, the application setting here is
based on more realistic scenarios, i.e., the central aggregation
server will choose a set of clients randomly from thousands of
participants, which we call the selection process, and collect
their gradient updates generated by training local models with
each own data in every training epoch. After such collection,
we assume a secure aggregation algorithm, which is an impor-
tant characteristic of FL, is executed so that the server cannot
observe individual updates sent by clients in plain text form
but can only acquire the aggregated value.
According to the property inference attack [19, 32, 23],
we know that particular batches, or particular property of
training data, can result in change of gradient on corresponding
neurons but have little effect on other neurons. As we know,
different training labels are units of different features. Given
that we sum up all property inferences towards the feature
set for a particular label, is it possible to infer some infor-
mation about such label rather than just its properties? As we
discovered, the answer is yes: an adversary can infer some
important information about the training label by analyzing
gradient changes in the training process. Here, without loss
of generality, we assume that the same labels possessed by
different clients result in similar local gradient changes. And
if we can determine the global updates consist of how many
such local changes, then the number of clients who own the
same labels can be obtained.
C. Attacker Capacity
One of the key features of our attacks is that they do
not require any observation of individuals’ gradient updates,
which makes them much easier to be launched than previous
attack models. Other basic pre-requirements are similar to
other attacks, as discussed below.
The attacker should obtain some control of a legal par-
ticipant in FL, specifically, he should be able to acquire
complete privileges of reading the content of messages from
the aggregation server, comprehending the structure of local
model, and modifying or changing the training data with
full freedom. He will need some prior knowledge about the
training process, i.e., the average number of labels owned by
each participant and the probable number of data samples per
label. Such information can be estimated by collecting the data
of a few participants and performing simple statistical analysis.
At last, the attacker should know the approximate number of
clients selected by the server in a single training round.
D. Attack Overview
We propose three original label inference attacks in FL
environment:
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Fig. 1. The basic workflow of our inference attacks. The server collects the gradient updates from selected clients and
aggregates them to the current global model Gt. The attacker downloads the current global model Gt, and trains different
labels respectively on the same Gt to obtain corresponding updates {gL0, ..., gLi, ..., gLn}. He can then estimate the quantity
proportion of labels in the training data by analyzing these updates.
1) Class Sniffing. In a single training round, the adversary
is able to infer whether a particular class of training data
appears.
2) Quantity Inference. In a single training round, the
attacker can make a judgment that whether a certain
training label is owned by a small group of clients or
a large group, and predicts how many clients own this
label.
3) Whole Determination. The malicious participant aims
to obtain the composition proportion about the dataset
labels of current global model.
The inferred information about training labels can be ap-
plied to many fields. We list three possible scenarios here:
1) Use the rare ‘labels’ to identify clients, since these labels
are usually owned by extremely few people. Specifically,
if such labels are detected in training by our attacks, the
attacker can know who participate in the training.
2) Apply this approach to detect the intrusion of malicious
participants. The intrusion phenomenon, e.g., backdoor
and poisoning attack in FL, was studied in prior works.
For instance, Fung et al. [16] applied cosine similarity to
detect Sybil, and Bagdasaryan et al. [14] proposed a type
of powerful backdoor attack under FL scenario. They
all mentioned that the updates provided by malicious
attackers are different from that of benign clients. Thus,
we can regard adversarial data as a type of unique labels
that are only owned by malicious clients, and detect
them in the training process.
3) Obtain the composition proportion of labels in the train-
ing process. We may use some other techniques to train
the learning model better (such as data augmentation,
focal loss [33]) if we find that the training labels are
unbalanced.
III. DESIGN
A. Background
In supervised learning, we denote the loss function as
Lossθ = D(F, Y ) (1)
where
Y = (f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fi(x), . . . , fk(x)) (2)
F = (g1(x), g2(x), . . . , gi(x), . . . , gk(x)) (3)
Here D(·, ·) could represent distinct formats under dif-
ferent scenarios, e.g., Mean Square Error (MSE) or Mean
Absolute Error (MAE). k is the number of label classes.
H = (f1, f2, . . . , fi, . . . , fk) is the mapping from in-
puts x to target label Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yi, . . . , yk); I =
(g1, g2, . . . , gi, . . . , gk) is the learning model that maps the
inputs x to the prediction label F .
The objective of the training process is to minimize the loss
of the network, and here we choose the popular stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) method to be the network’s optimizer.
SGD decides how to modify the network parameters θ in
each training iteration. Specifically, it calculates the opposite
direction of the gradient of the loss function in terms of every
member in θ, combines it with the learning rate γ, and updates
θ to the next state. When the value of the loss function shrinks
to a relative bottom bound, the training process stops. The
calculation of gradients is implemented by back-propagation
operation from the last to the first layer of the whole network,
and the standard updated formula of SGD is θ := θ−γ∇L(θ).
B. Overview
The basic process of our attack is presented in Figure 1.
There are one or more observers, in other words, adversarial
attackers in the training process. At each training iteration t,
they download the current global model, which is the detailed
parameter information of the network and denoted as Gt
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Fig. 2. The positions of the neuron weights we are inter-
ested in, denoted as {WL0in , . . . ,WLiin , . . . ,WLnin } of labels
{L0, . . . , Li, . . . , Ln}, respectively.
(hence FL problems are always in the white-box form). Next,
the attackers can train local model with auxiliary dataset to
obtain relatively standard gradient changes gt+1−Gt, and then
conduct analysis between the global updates Gt+1 − Gt and
gt+1−Gt to determine whether a particular label appear in the
training round t. Furthermore, based on a much deeper com-
parison between the magnitude of gt+1−Gt and Gt+1−Gt, the
quantity information, i.e., how many clients own a particular
training label, can also be acquired. One thing to note is that
if these observers/attackers are selected as training clients,
their contribution to the global model needs to be removed
when comparing the magnitude of gt+1−Gt and Gt+1−Gt.
We name the former type of attack (determining whether
a particular label appears) as Class Sniffing, and the latter
types (acquiring quantity information) as Quantity Inference.
These two types of attack are from the perspective of a single
training round. We also propose another label inference attack,
Whole Determination, which can determine the composition
proportion of training labels in the whole training process.
C. Class Sniffing
Like most prior work, we build these attack models on
the supervised classifying task. We utilize a feed-forward
neural network with output size equal to the number of total
classes. For each training label, the position of output neurons
is shown in Figure 2. We discovered a phenomenon that is
similar to the basis of property inference attack [32]. More
specifically, in our experiments, we observed that, using a
particular label L in the training will make the inputting
weights (the network connection weights denoted as WLin in
Figure 2) of corresponding output neuron grow significantly
and the weight vectors of other neurons decrease slightly. Such
observation motivated our design of the Class Sniffing attack.
We use NLint to denote the updates of weight set W
L
in.
Both WLin and N
L
int exist in a vector form with the size
equal to the number of neurons in the layer before the output
layer. For example, when we train a model on the MNIST
dataset, the average increase achieves approximately +3.00,
Algorithm 1 The threshold acquiring for Class Sniffing
Input:
Attacker’s auxiliary data samples of different training labels,
DL0, DL1, . . . , DLn;
Approximate number of labels owned by selected clients in
a training round, NL;
Selection proportion of clients in a training round, P ;
Approximate number of whole participants, Np;
Inputting weight positions of output layer each label, WLiin ;
Output:
The threshold that indicates the existence of a certain label
in a training round, Thlow;
Begin:
Receive θt from server
for i = 1 to len(DL0, DL1, . . . , DLn) do
W = []
for j in DL0, DL1, . . . , DLn do
gj = Local train(θt, j) - θt
w = acquire(gj , WLiin ) // acquire updates from gj ;
W .append(w)
end for
W = delete(W , i) // delete the updates of WLiin on gi;
Thilow = Np * P * NL * mean(W )
end for
Local train(θt, DL):
use DL to train local model θt
return local model gt+1
while the average decrease is −0.25. The worst case happens
when there is no sample of a particular label in the training
data, and then its corresponding inputting weights accept all
negative impact without any positive benefit. This case can be
simulated with our auxiliary data by restricting this particular
label L not to emerge in training, so that the weight updates
of its corresponding neurons would be as the worst case.
The inputting weight updates vector in such worst case can
be regarded as a threshold Thlow. In a particular round, if
the updates of WLin corresponding to label L are higher than
Thlow, it means that L appears in training; and if the weight
changes are approximately close to this threshold, label L
can be considered absent in the training round. The detailed
acquiring process of such thresholds is shown in Algorithm 1.
D. Quantity Inference
Similar to the workflow of Class Sniffing, in Quantity Infer-
ence, malicious attacker trains his local model using auxiliary
data, especially just using data samples of a single label, and
then obtain several local updates {gL1, gL2, . . . , gLn}, where
each gLi corresponds to a label Li. And we denote the increase
of WLiin as Wp when the local model is trained with the
samples of Li. The decreases on the same WLiin are Wns when
the local model is input with the samples of other labels, and
both Wp and Wn are vectors too. But their magnitudes are
different, i.e., the extent of increase is much higher than that
of decrease. The specific values of weight update magnitudes
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may be changing in different training rounds. Nevertheless,
the information about magnitudes in different training rounds
can be obtained by training local models on the current global
model, just like what the attacker does in Class Sniffing.
As it happens, the positive effect of the increase can be
offset by the accumulated impact of other decreases, and this
phenomenon appears when a label is possessed by a small
number of clients. However, we can still launch the following
attack with the existence of above phenomenon. The details
of such Quantity Inference attack is described in Algorithm 2
and explained below.
The changes of inputting neuron weights do reflect the
quantity information about training data, but not all of them
possess such evident reflection, which means part of weights
increase less than the rest and sometimes they could decrease
even if the corresponding label appears in training. This set of
weights are easily to experience the aforementioned ‘Offset’
phenomenon, which could make the attack fail. Hence, the
first question from the attacker perspective is how to remove
them from the original intact inputting neuron weights. First,
when we train the network with the data of a certain label in
the training process, its existence will make the corresponding
inputting neuron weights grow while the inputting neuron
weights of other labels decrease. Following the simple super-
position rules, the higher the ratio Rnp = |Wn|/|Wp| between
magnitudes of Wn and Wp is, the easier ‘Offset’ phenomenon
emerges. Thus, we can set a threshold ThR towards Rnp, and
compare Wp on each inputting weight wi in the weight vector
Win with the Wns on the same wi corresponding to other
local updates. If there is an outlier whose corresponding ratio
Rnp is higher than ThR , we will delete it from the original
set Noint and get a new set Nint, as shown in Algorithm 2
from Line 9 to Line 19.
Next, let us take a label L∗ as an example. After local
training process using auxiliary data, there will be following
local updates {gL1, . . . , gL∗, . . . , gLn}. Correspondingly, its
original updates of the inputting weights are No∗int, which is
a vector with the size equal to the number of neurons in the
layer before the output. Then, we can regard the members
of No∗int on gL∗ as Wp , and the updates vectors of the same
WL∗in on other gLs as Wns, followed by the process of deleting
the aforementioned outliers and obtaining the new set N∗int.
Next, we are able to regard each member of N∗int on gL∗
as w∗p, which denotes the increase when label L∗ is owned
by a single client, and the averaged value of each member
of N∗int on other gLs as w
∗
n, which indicates the negative
impact of other labels. With w∗p and w
∗
n, we can calculate
all possible numbers of clients who own label L∗ by using
each inputting weight change Ni in N∗int. The client number
calculation formula is (5), which is a derivation form of the
simple average aggregation shown in (4).
w∗p · x+ (Np · P ·NL − x) · w∗n = Np · P ·Gt+1 (4)
x =
Np · P · (Gt+1 −NL · w∗n)
w∗p − w∗n
(5)
Fig. 3. The inputting weight updates of the output layer (its
former layer has 50 neurons) when the model is trained with
the samples of label 0. And the updates circled by red ellipse
are N∗∗int.
Here, NL indicates the average number of labels owned by se-
lected clients, which is the same as that in Algorithm 1. x is the
predicted number of clients, and each Ni corresponds to such
a x. However, there are still abnormal weight changes whose
corresponding xs are unreasonable. For instance, providing
that there are Np · P clients in a particular round, some xs
could be larger than Np ·P or less than 0 (the circumstance of
less than 0 is regarded as outlier since we assume label L∗ has
been proven by Class Sniffing to be present in training). Thus,
we also need to remove them from the current weight change
set and obtain a final version N∗∗int, which is shown in Figure 3,
and the detailed steps can be seen in Algorithm 2 from Line 20
to Line 27. The final number of clients who owns label L∗
can be determined by the mean of xs corresponding to N∗∗int.
Another point worth mentioning is that the standard deviation
of xs corresponding to N∗∗int should ideally be small, however
occasionally it is large, in which case we abort the Quantity
Inference attack. Such scenario happens at an extremely low
frequency (below 1% in the whole training process).
E. Whole Determination
If the attacker is not sensitive about time immediacy and
patient enough, which means he cares about the composition
proportion of entire training data over a long training span
rather than just a single or several training rounds, we can
propose another new attack. This attack lays emphasis on the
overfitting characteristic of learning model when the training
process sustains constantly, which suits best to FL application
scenarios.
Let us describe an example case. In the training process
of a deep neural network, there are a set of labels appearing
frequently (the number of samples is large) and other labels
appearing occasionally (the number of samples is small),
denoted by {Lf1, Lf2, . . . , Lfk1} and {Lo1, Lo2, . . . , Lok2},
respectively. Like the former attacks, the attacker downloads
current global model Gt and trains his local one with auxiliary
data inputted label by label, and eventually he can obtain
all corresponding local gradient updates of each label, i.e.,
{gf1, gf2, . . . , gfk1, go1, go2, . . . , gok2}. When we investigated
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Algorithm 2 Quantity Inference Attack
Input:
Attacker’s auxiliary data samples of different training
labels, DL0, DL1, . . . , DLn;
Approximate number of labels owned by selected clients
in a training round, NL;
Selection proportion of clients in a training round, P ;
Approximate number of whole participants, Np;
Inputting weight positions of output layer each label, WLiin ;
The interest label, L∗;
Ratio threshold ThR = 0.5;
Output:
The number of clients who own L∗, X∗;
1: Begin:
2: Receive θt from server
3: W = []
4: for i in DL0, DL1, . . . , DLn do
5: gi = Local train(θt, i) - θt
6: w = acquire(gi, WLiin ) // acquire updates from gi;
7: W .append(w)
8: end for
9: N∗int = []
10: x∗ = []
11: Wtemp = delete(W , L∗) // delete the updates of L∗;
12: for each wi in WL∗in do
13: wp = W [L∗][wi]
14: wn = mean(Wtemp)[wi]
15: Rnp = | wn | / | wp |
16: if Rnp ≤ ThR then
17: N∗int.append(wi)
18: end if
19: end for
20: for each Ni in N∗int do
21: w∗p = W [L
∗][Ni]
22: w∗n = mean(Wtemp)[Ni]
23: xi = Np · P · (Gt+1 −NL · w∗n)/(w∗p − w∗n)
24: if xi > Np · P or xi < 0 then
25: delete(N∗int, Ni) // delete Ni from N
∗
int;
26: end if
27: end for
28: N∗∗int = N
∗
int
29: for each Ni in N∗∗int do
30: w∗p = W [L
∗][Ni]
31: w∗n = mean(Wtemp)[Ni]
32: xi = Np · P · (Gt+1 −NL · w∗n)/(w∗p − w∗n)
33: x∗.append(xi)
34: end for
35: X∗ = mean(x∗)
the inputting weight changes of one particular frequent label
and an occasional label, for instance, Nf1int of Lf1 and N
o1
int
of Lo1, we observed an interesting phenomenon that the
corresponding absolute value of Nf1int and N
o1
int on other gs
(except gf1 and go1) present a huge difference. That is to say
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Fig. 4. The ratio (|Wp|/|Wn|) change of a frequent label among
training rounds.
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Fig. 5. The ratio (|Wp|/|Wn|) change of an occasional label
among training rounds.
that the absolute values of Nf1int in other frequent gradient
updates, i.e., {gf2, . . .}, are much higher than those of No1int
in the same gradient updates {gf2, . . .}. This is from the
perspective of Wn. Similar huge difference can be seen for
Wp (e.g., the difference between the N
f1
int on gf1 and the
No1int on go1). In various experiments, such phenomenon can
be easily observed. For instance, it appears after 10 epochs
in the MNIST classifier training process, which is shown in
Figure 4 and Figure 5. The attacker is then able to analyze this
phenomenon to access the information about the composition
proportion of training labels.
1) Explanation: Let us give a possible explanation about
this phenomenon here. The connection between inputting
weight updates of the output layer and the corresponding labels
is strong enough that we can regard the neuron weights xin
as the features set of each label. Then, (2) is changed to
Y = (ff1(x
f1
in ), ..., ffk1(x
fk1
in ), fo1(x
o1
in), ..., fok2(x
ok2
in )) (6)
F = (gf1(x
f1
in ), ..., gfk1(x
fk1
in ), go1(x
o1
in), ..., gok2(x
ok2
in )) (7)
Here k1 + k2 = k. We assume that the features embedded
in the neurons of the output layer are highly independent of
each other after the extract and filter of front layers. This
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independence is regarded as they are irrelevant to each other,
hence their derivatives to each other are zero:
∂xmin
∂xnin
= 0, (m 6= n) (8)
The output format of a classifier is a type of probability
vector, and the outputting result of a particular input is the
label corresponding to the highest dimension in the probability
vector. Then, we know that the quantities of data samples in
terms of different labels are different, hence their proportions
in the target label y are different. We thus hypothesize that
the proportion can be measured by calculating the derivative
of y on the features of the output layer. If a label has more
samples, its proportion will be greater, and vice versa. Then,
it is presented as
∂Y
∂xfiin
 ∂Y
∂xojin
, (i ∈ (0, k1) & j ∈ (0, k2)) (9)
Then the specific format of the updates is |∇f1Loss(θ)f2|
and |∇o1Loss(θ)f2|, which corresponds to the aforementioned
phenomenon from the perspective of Wn.∣∣∇f1Loss(θ)f2∣∣ = ∂Loss(θ)f2
∂xf1in
+
k1∑
i=2
∂Loss(θ)f2
∂xfiin
· ∂x
fi
in
∂xf1in
+
k2∑
j=1
∂Loss(θ)f2
∂xojin
· ∂x
oj
in
∂xf1in
=
∂D(F, Yf2)
∂xf1in
=
∂D(Yf2)
∂F
· ∂F
∂xf1in
+
∂D(F )
∂Yf2
· ∂Yf2
∂xf1in
=
∂D(Yf2)
∂F
· ∂g1(x
f1
in )
∂xf1in
+
∂D(F )
∂Yf2
· ∂f
f2
1 (x
f1
in )
∂xf1in
|∇o1Loss(θ)f2| = ∂D(Yf2)
∂F
· ∂F
∂xo1in
+
∂D(F )
∂Yf2
· ∂Yf2
∂xo1in
=
∂D(Yf2)
∂F
· ∂g1(x
o1
in)
∂xo1in
+
∂D(F )
∂Yf2
· ∂f
f2
1 (x
o1
in)
∂xo1in
The Yf2 here denotes the next version of ideal model
when the current global model accepts the input of label
Lf2 training samples, hence it is natural that there is only
difference existing in the derivatives of f2(x
f2
in ) between these
two versions to some extent. In other words, the differences
of other fs can be neglected:
ff21 (x
f1
in ) = f1(x
f1
in )
ff21 (x
o1
in) = f1(x
o1
in)
(10)
Since Lf1 and Lf2 are frequent labels, Lo1 is an occasional
label, and F is the current global model, which is the same
in both cases, we can obtain that
∂g1(x
f1
in )
∂xf1in
 ∂g1(x
o1
in)
∂xo1in
(11)
∂ff21 (x
f1
in )
∂xf1in
=
∂f1(x
f1
in )
∂xf1in
 ∂f
f2
1 (x
o1
in)
∂xo1in
=
∂f1(x
o1
in)
∂xo1in
(12)
Combine the above results, we can conclude that
|∇f1Loss(θ)f2|  |∇o1Loss(θ)f2| (13)
2) Attack Approach: Based on the phenomenon above
(13), we can conclude that the ratio Rpn = |Wp|/|Wn|
of occasional labels is larger than that of frequent labels,
and leverage such conclusion to determine the quantity re-
lation between different labels. Like former attacks, when
the adversary launches the Whole Determination attack, he
trains his local model on the basis of Gt with auxiliary
data DL0, DL1, . . . , DLn, and correspondingly obtains local
updates {gL1, gL2, . . . , gLn}. Then, he can calculate all Rpns
by using data from {gL1, gL2, . . . , gLn}. Next, these Rpns will
be formed as a vector Vpn, where each label corresponds
to a vector V ipn. Finally, these vectors can be clustered into
different groups by an unsupervised algorithm, and the vectors
being in the same group indicates their corresponding labels
have approximately the same number of data samples in
training. The quantity could present huge differences if labels
belong to different clusters. Here, the unsupervised algorithm
we adopted is Hierarchical Clustering, which can classify
given data into different clusters with the metric of Eu-
clidean Distance. Attackers may also choose other clustering
approaches.
IV. EVALUATION
All experiments were conducted on a workstation running
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS equipped with a 2.10GHz CPU Intel
Xeon(R) Gold 6130, 64GB RAM, and an NVIDIA TITAN
RTX GPU card. We construct the model mainly on PyTorch
[34], and use Scipy-scikit-learn [35] to implement some ma-
chine learning models.
A. Experiment Setting
1) Auxiliary Data: Like many other inference attacks on
machine learning, the attacker also needs auxiliary data. It
consists of some data samples of the labels he wants to infer.
In practice, such data samples are often not difficult to acquire.
The number of data samples should be close to the average
quantity owned by participants. If the samples are not enough,
the attacker may try reproduction techniques such as GAN to
construct more similar samples.
2) Network Structure: The main structure is based on
standard construction of federated learning [36], with some
modifications for practical purpose, e.g., participating clients
are able to process several epochs locally rather than just a
single epoch before sending their updates to the aggregation
server [37]. The symbols of major hyper-parameters are de-
fined in Table I.
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TABLE I
HYPER-PARAMETERS OF FL IN EVALUATION
Symbols Description
Lbs Local model training batch size
Llr Local model learning rate
Lep Local model training epochs
P Selection proportion of clients in a training round
model Selected models to accomplish learning task
Np Approximate number of whole participants
TABLE II
DATASETS AND RELEVANT INFORMATION IN OUR EXPERIMENTS
Datasets #Records #Labels Model
MNIST 60.0K 10 MLP & CNN
CIFAR10 60.0K 10 LeNet5 & Resnet18
Fer2013 28.7K 7 Resnet18
HAM10000 37.0K 7 Resnet18
3) Datasets: The dataset information (number of training
labels and corresponding training model) are presented in
Table II. We choose these datasets that are close to our
concerns about privacy in daily life. For instance, Fer2013
is relevant to face recognition, while HAM10000 aims at
diagnosing several skin cancers. Both of them contain private
information owned by different people.
• MNIST. As one of the most popular and classical datasets
in machine learning, MNIST includes 10 labels, each of
which corresponds to approximately 6,000 32×32 gray
handwritten digital images. 5,000 of them are training
data, while 1,000 are for testing. Because of its simplicity
and the small number of total training data, it is not
easy for deep and complicated models to achieve high
performance. Hence we choose a standard but simple
MLP (multi-layer perceptron) and a CNN model for it,
both of which are able to achieve 98% accuracy.
The MLP model contains an input layer, followed by two
fully-connected hidden layers of size 256 and 64. There is
a dropout operation between hidden layers, and finally it
has an output layer with size of 64. We use rectified linear
unit (ReLU) as the activation function for all layers. Other
settings are Lbs = 64, Llr = 0.01, Lep = 3. The CNN
model consists of two spatial convolution layers with 10
and 20 filters (kernel size is 5×5), max pooling layers
with size set to 2, a dropout layer and a fully-connected
layer with size 320, and finally an output layer whose
size is 50. The activation function is ReLU, and other
settings are the same as MLP.
• CIFAR10. CIFAR10 consists of 10 classes containing
6,000 32×32 RGB images each, which can also be
divided into 5,000 for training and 1,000 for testing.
The entire training labels contain common objects in
daily life, suitable for the object identifying task on
smartphones. For clustering model, we select two com-
monly used networks, LeNet5 [38] and ResNet18. The
former can achieve 85% accuracy, while the latter can
achieve 98%. LeNet5 consists of two convolution layers
with 6 and 16 filters respectively (kernel size of them
is 5×5), pooling layers with size set to 2, two fully-
connected linear layers with size set to 400 and 120, and
an output layer and a softmax layer. Its parameter setting
is Lbs = 64, Llr = 0.1, Lep = 3. The specific network
structure of Resnet18 can be found in [39]. The parameter
setting on Resnet18 is Lbs = 64, Llr = 0.1, Lep = 3.
• Fer2013. Fer2013 [40] originates from a Kaggle compe-
tition, which is Facial Expression Recognition Challenge
2013, and it aims to build a learning model to recognize
human’s expression automatically. It contains approxi-
mately 30,000 facial RGB images of different expressions
with size restricted to 48×48, and the main labels of it
can be divided into 7 types: 0=Angry, 1=Disgust, 2=Fear,
3=Happy, 4=Sad, 5=Surprise, 6=Neutral. The Disgust
expression has the minimal number of images – 600,
while other labels have nearly 5,000 samples each. We
randomly select 80% of the samples for each label as
the training data, and use the rest for testing. We choose
Resnet18 as the learning model for Fer2013. It is trained
under the setting Lbs = 64, Llr = 0.02, Lep = 3. The
testing accuracy is 95%.
• HAM10000. HAM10000 [41] is a large collection of
multi-source dermatoscopic images of pigmented lesions.
There are nearly 37,000 records about skin lesions, and
they are classified into 7 labels, i.e., 0=Melanocytic nevi,
1=Melanoma, 2=Benign keratosis-like lesions, 3=Basal
cell carcinoma, 4=Actinic keratoses, 5=Vascular lesions,
6=Dermatofibroma. Each label corresponds to approx-
imately 5,000 images. Similarly, we randomly divide
the data into 4,500 for training and 500 for testing.
HAM10000 is also trained on Resnet18, and its param-
eters are Lbs = 128, Llr = 0.1, Lep = 3. The testing
accuracy is 90%.
B. Class Sniffing
In order to simulate more practical application scenarios of
FL, we try to allocate training dataset samples randomly. Let
us take MNIST as an example. We create a setting with 100
participants. In each training round, the server is required to
select 10 clients randomly and collect their gradient updates
to form an aggregated global model. In our setting, each
participant can possess 3, 4 or 5 main labels and a small
number of other labels, and the number of data samples
per main label is much larger than that of other labels. All
participants select their own main labels randomly. The data
allocations of other datasets are similar to that of MNIST,
which we believe can simulate the practical scenarios to some
extent.
The goal of Class Sniffing is to predict whether a certain
label appears in a training round, hence the evaluated metric
here is the success rate of prediction. That is, if we correctly
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TABLE III
THE SUCCESS RATE OF CLASS SNIFFING ON EXPERIMENT DATASETS
Dataset Model Success Rate(%)
Labels 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
MNIST MLP 94 97 95 98 99 93 94 96 97 95CNN 96 97 98 93 96 95 95 96 98 94
CIFAR10 LeNet5 92 94 97 99 98 93 96 98 99 96Resnet18 93 97 97 94 97 95 96 93 98 97
Fer2013 Resnet18 99 94 95 94 97 98 98 - - -
HAM10000 Resnet18 93 97 98 98 98 96 95 - - -
TABLE IV
THE SUCCESS RATE OF QUANTITY INFERENCE ON EXPERIMENT DATASETS
Dataset Model Success Rate(%)
Labels 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
MNIST MLP 91 91 94 93 93 94 92 97 96 92CNN 95 96 98 98 100 95 95 100 100 96
CIFAR10 LeNet5 96 94 98 96 96 92 94 97 94 94Resnet18 92 95 94 93 95 92 98 93 95 96
Fer2013 Resnet18 97 92 100 100 98 95 98 - - -
HAM10000 Resnet18 95 93 94 95 93 94 97 - - -
detect the existence of a label for Ts times and fail for Tf
times in several training rounds, then the success rate is
Ts/(Ts + Tf ). We perform this attack on all datasets with
each own standard model for 100 training rounds, and the
results are presented in Table III. As shown in the table, the
success rate is relatively high (above 90%) for all datasets,
which demonstrates the effectiveness of Class Sniffing.
C. Quantity Inference
The Class Sniffing attack is designed to detect the existence
of a particular label, while Quantity Inference aims to acquire
the quantity information of a label in a single training cy-
cle. Because the pre-settings of Class Sniffing are relatively
practical, there is no need to change them here. That is, the
participants of FL are also set to 100, the randomly selected
fraction is 10%, and the allocation strategy in terms of dataset
samples is the same.
1) Metrics: Considering both the threat model and the
problems we want to solve, we need to define a new metric to
evaluate the attack here. The main idea is to set an error bound
and evaluate how often the attacker can estimate the number
of clients possessing a particular label within the error bound.
Specifically, in a particular training round, assume there are i
clients possessing a label L, and the attacker launches Quantity
Inference in this round and obtains an estimated number iˆ of
clients who possess label L. We regard an attack successful
if |ˆi− i| ≤ α, while failed when |ˆi− i| > α, where the error
bound α controls the accuracy requirement. We set α = 1 in
our experimental evaluation. Then, by recording the number
of times the attacker successfully make the estimation (i.e.,
within the error bound) and fails it (i.e., larger than the error
bound), we can calculate the success rate.
2) Results: We evaluates the Quantity Inference attack on
all datasets with each own standard models for 100 training
rounds, and the results are shown in Table IV. We can see
that the success rate is high for all datasets, i.e., between
91% and 100%, which shows the effective of our Quantity
Inference attack. Moreover, the results are consistently high
across the four datasets, which shows the broad applicability
of our approach.
3) Impact of Hyper Parameters: We also study how Quan-
tity Inference is affected by hyper-parameters, in particular Lbs
(local model training batch size) and Lep (local model training
epochs). We choose MNIST with CNN for our study, and fix
other settings as in Sec. IV-A3 when we evaluate a particular
parameter. The results are shown as Figure 6 and Figure 7.
For the impact of different batch sizes shown in Figure 6,
we can observe that success rate hits the bottom (82%) when
the batch size is set to relatively small, and reaches a relatively
high level (94%) with batch size at 20. As we know, the batch
size in training should not be set too small as it may lead
to more calculation iterations and cause the model perform
bad. Hence, we think Class Sniffing should be effective under
common batch size settings.
We can also clearly observe the impact of local training
epochs in Figure 7, where the success rate decreases slightly
when the local epoch rises (the lowest is 87%). To our
knowledge, the standard application of FL usually allows
participants to train their local model only one epoch. The
reason is that considering the limited computation capacity
of local devices, more epochs will drastically increase the
computation load and may affect the normal operation of those
devices. Recently, some researchers propose that local devices
can shoulder more computation tasks [37], which means more
local training epochs are possible, however more than 10
epochs would still be quite demanding. Thus, we believe that
Quantity Inference should work well in most circumstances,
even when there are multiple local training epochs (as long as
not too many).
4) Quantity of Participants: To further investigate the
practicality of Quantity Inference, we consider changing the
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Fig. 6. The success rate of Quantity Inference with different
training batch sizes among 100 training rounds.
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Fig. 7. The success rate of Quantity Inference with different
local training epochs among 100 training rounds.
selection proportion P and the overall number of participants
Np. In our former default settings, P = 10% and Np = 100.
In this study, we explore a range of values, and the results are
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9.
We first fix the overall number of participants to 100, and
change the selection fraction from 0.1 to 0.5 with the step of
0.1. If we still use the original metric in Sec. IV-C1, which
is denoted as Metric 1 in the figures, we can see that the
success rate shows a moderate decline from 99% to 88% when
the proportion is increasing. Such trend is reasonable, as the
more clients there are in each round, the harder it is to achieve
the same success rate under an absolute error bound. However,
we could consider a new metric Metric % based on a relative
error bound (depending on the number of participants), which
is defined as the difference between the real number of clients
possessing a label and the estimated number with respect to an
error bound α = 5% ·Np ·P rather than α = 1 of Metric 1.
Under Metric %, the success rate always stays at a high level
(near 100%).
Then, we make the selection proportion unchanged at 10%,
and increase the number of overall participants from 100 to
1000. We can observe the trend that the success rate slightly
decreases when the number of participants increases. However,
if we use the metric Metric % based on relative error bound,
we can see that the success rate stays at a high level (near
100%). Overall, both figures demonstrate the effectiveness of
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Fig. 8. The success rate of Quantity Inference with different
selection proportions among 100 participants.
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Fig. 9. The success rate of Quantity Inference with different
numbers of participants with selection proportion 10%.
our Quantity Inference attack over a wide range of number of
overall participants and selection proportion.
D. Whole Determination
Whole Determination is an attack typically towards de-
veloped models, which have been trained with considerable
data samples and perform well on corresponding given tasks.
Hence, for its evaluation, we choose to launch the attack in the
middle and late stages of the training process when the model
is near to convergence. However, it does not mean that Whole
Determination cannot work in more advanced stages. Before
the attack, all datasets above are required to train themselves
under their own default settings. When the loss of model
decreases to a relative small value, the attacker will use Whole
Determination to obtain the composition proportion of training
labels.
1) Dataset Allocation: In previous experiments, the num-
ber of data samples with each label is decided via random
selection, but here we cannot apply this selection strategy.
We need to make the numbers of data samples belonging to
each label have differences, otherwise we cannot evaluate the
performance of Whole Determination. To start with, we should
figure out the connection between the magnitude of ratio
difference and the proportion difference of labels. We conduct
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Fig. 10. The ratio difference between two labels, e.g., label L1
and L2, and the difference is Ratio1−Ratio2. The index of
horizontal axis (2, 3, 4, 5, ..., 100) means the number of data
samples owned by L1 is {1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, ..., 1/100} of
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experiments by changing the number of samples belonging to
a certain label and record the corresponding ratio difference.
The results are presented in Figure 10. As shown in the figure,
obvious ratio difference can be observed when there is a four-
fold difference in the number of samples owned by the two
labels. As a result, we divide the whole labels into 3 groups
randomly, and ensure that each label in the first group can
be allocated with Q data samples, the second group can only
acquire Q/4, and the last group just get Q/5 samples. These
groups will be used to train learning model, and what we
want is to evaluate if our approach can detect this composition
proportion.
2) Results: We conduct the experiments on all datasets.
For each dataset, we train it for 20 times and launch Whole
Determination attack in every training. The middle stage of
training is defined as the round when the testing accuracy is
approximately 50%, while the late stage is when the testing ac-
curacy exceeds 85%. Clearly, the dataset allocation is different
in each training process because of the random allocation. We
also use success rate as our metric, and only consider the attack
successful when the clustering results are exactly the same as
the data allocation before training, including the number of
clusters and the specific labels in each cluster; otherwise we
regard it as a failure.
The results are presented in Table V. We can see that the
average success rate is very high (almost 95%), which shows
that Whole Determination attack can be effective under such
circumstances. The success rate of middle stage is a little
worse than that of late stage. We think the reason could be that
the exploration direction of gradient is relatively more random
in the middle stage of training.
TABLE V
THE RESULTS OF WHOLE DETERMINATION ON EXPERIMENT DATASETS
Dataset Model Success Rate(%)
Stages Middle Late
MNIST MLP 95 100CNN 95 100
CIFAR10 LeNet5 90 95Resnet18 95 100
Fer2013 Resnet18 95 95
HAM10000 Resnet18 95 95
V. DISCUSSION
A. Network Layers
It could be asked why we consider the output layer and
whether similar phenomenon exists in other layers, e.g., hidden
layers. The main task of the front network layers is typically to
extract and filter the features of training data, which means the
objects to be processed are various features. The emergence
of a particular feature leads to corresponding gradient updates,
while its absence has no influence [32]. It is interesting to
note that a certain label usually possesses many different
features, in other words, it is an unity of multiple features.
And different labels possibly have the same features, e.g.,
cats and dogs have similar fur features. What is more, in
some special neural networks, the features embedded in front
layers are not explainable or interpretable to human ana-
lysts practically, especially the cases in convolution operation.
These characteristics make the front layers not applicable to
our case, where we want to obtain the quantity information
about training labels. However, in case we cannot access
the output layer but only several front layers, we could try
to apply some Explainable Machine Learning techniques to
extract the key features of each class, like LIME [42] for
linear classifiers and LEMNA [43] for deep neural networks.
Explainable Machine Learning aims at figuring out why a
particular input sample is clustered into its corresponding label
and obtaining some relatively interpretable reasons for users,
especially for debuggers and computer security practitioners.
And these reasons, namely the key features, can be served
as the identifications for different labels, and our method is
possibly able to build on them.
B. Defense
The three attacks proposed by us share similarity to property
inference attack (albeit our focus switches from the existential
proof to quantity information). Thus, some defenses designed
for property inference may be leveraged to mitigate our
attacks. Here we discuss two possible defenses.
1) Compress the gradient updates: As mentioned by [44],
there is no need to share the whole network parameters in col-
laborative learning. In other words, compressing or distilling
the significant neuron updates can also make the global model
converge and achieve great performance. As for our attacks,
the adversary does not need to observe any individual updates,
and what he needs is only the global model parameters, hence
there is some possible impact to the attacks if the participants
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TABLE VI
THE RESULTS OF COMPRESSION DEFENSES ON MNIST
Compression Rate Success Rate(%) Aborting Rate(%)
0 96 0
0.1 95 3
0.2 96 10
0.3 97 20
0.4 94 28
0.5 95 37
cannot acquire the whole global model (it can only acquire
part of it).
We try to simulate such defense in our experiment setting,
and we choose to keep the weights whose gradient updates
are relatively greater and make other weights invisible to
participants. Specifically, if we set the compression rate (CR)
in advance, each client will select top CR of inputting weight
updates to be uploaded to the server. This simple compression
operation might make the convergence of global model slower
to some extent, but the influence to performance of the model
is not great. And under such circumstances, we conduct some
experiments on Quantity Inference under the default setting
(MNIST on CNN). The results can be seen in Table VI.
We launch Quantity Inference for 100 rounds under each CR
setting. From the results, we can see that the success rate of our
attack is not impacted by such defense. However, the aborting
rate increases a lot since Quantity Inference is designed to
abort the round whose corresponding standard deviation of
x’s (Sec. III-D) is high. Thus, the aborting operation indirectly
makes this attack less effective.
2) Dropout: Another possible defense is adding Dropout
Layer to the neural networks, which is also an effective
approach to mitigate the overfitting phenomenon. Since its
random removal of the features in training process, the dropout
operation may make the gradient updates of clients more
different from each other, which possibly poses some impact to
our attacks. However in our initial evaluation experiments, es-
pecially for MNIST dataset, both MLP and CNN (Sec. IV-A3)
have dropout layers, and the success rate of our three attacks is
still extremely high. Thus, we are not sure whether the dropout
technique is able to defense our attack methods and plan to
conduct a deeper analysis in the future.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy-preserving Federated Learning
Federated learning is an evolution form of distributed
learning, and it enables training data stay locally while a
collaborative global model can be learned. Existing work with
the considering of privacy can be classified into Differential
Privacy mechanism (DP) and secure Multi-Party Computation
(MPC). Geyer et al. [29] stand on the perspective of the client
and realize differential privacy protection by adding Gaussian
noise to the local updates under the setting where there are
a large number of participants, and similar work can also
be seen in [30]. Hamm et al. [45] apply knowledge transfer
techniques to aggregate multiple models trained on individual
devices with DP guarantee.
Bonawitz et al. [28] design secure multi-party aggregation
techniques, pertinent for federated learning, to enable partici-
pants to encrypt themselves so that the central server cannot
observe individual gradient updates in the plain form and only
do the aggregation operation. Mohassel and Zhang [46] enable
two servers to train a global model with multi-party encrypted
data, and the training process is protected by MPC techniques.
B. Inference Attack
Different types of inference attacks in collaborative setting
emerge frequently. Hitaj et al. [23] create a GAN structure
to imitate the output probability distributions and use reverse
learning to infer the training data. Hayes et al. [25] note
the privacy leakage in the scenario of machine-learning-as-
a-service application and also train several GANs to detect
overfitting characteristics of input-output pairs. Truex et al.
[20] propose a membership inference threat on the surface
of FL, but they assume FL is under machine-learning-as-a-
service application and adversaries hold the ability that sniffing
output probability distributions of all other clients rather
than model parameter updates, which we think it is not an
inference attack towards the standard FL. Melis et al. [19] lay
emphasis on the unintended feature leakage in collaborative
learning setting by training a shadow attack model to infer
information about training data, and the threat model have
been simplified to some extent. Different from above works,
Wang et al. [26] assume that the aggregation server in FL is
malicious, and they combine the main work of global model,
identity distinguishing and traditional authentication task to
form the mixed discriminator of a GAN that is able to track
particular victims and reconstruct their private training data.
Much similar to the aggregation feature of FL, in aggregated
location field, Pyrgelis et al. [21] use a challenge game to
distinguish the victims with other participates and then track
the location information of particular victims.
There are also some relative work about property inference
attack for traditional machine learning, in both white-box
and black-box settings. For instance, under black-box circum-
stance, Salem et al. [24] use GAN to achieve reconstruction
and then sniff the information about training data between
different versions of learning model based on updates of output
results. Ateniese et al. [32] use different property of training
data to obtain several meta-models, and combine these meta-
models to sense the existence of a particular label. Ganju et al.
[47] construct an inference attack towards fully-connected
neural networks, and they realize it by applying post-training
techniques to a white-box model.
C. Other Attacks and Defenses
Attack. Federated learning is a fertile research field for secu-
rity problems, and there have been several other interesting
attacks recently. Bagdasaryan et al. [14] create a type of
backdoor approach in FL setting, which can pose the backdoor
threat after only a few rounds of attack with high target
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class accuracy. Baruch et al. [15] propose a poisoning attack
whose impact is profound and it can escape prevalent abnormal
detection. They realize it by splitting abnormal parts in a few
neurons to a large number of neurons, and they also investigate
the capacity scope of current abnormal detection approaches
on the degree of abnormality. Bhagoji et al. [17] explore the
threat of model poisoning attacks on FL launched by a single,
non-colluding malicious agent, where the adversarial objective
is to cause the model to mis-classify a set of chosen inputs
with high confidence.
Defense. Shen et al. [48] apply the clustering operation to
individual parameter updates before aggregation to detect ma-
licious participants in distributed learning setting. Blanchard
et al. [49] use Euclidean Distance to measure the contribution
of clients to global model, and design a selection strategy to
tolerate the gradient contribution from Byzantine attackers.
Fung et al. [16] present the impact of sybils attack in FL
and design a detection algorithm by comparing the cosine
similarity between gradient updates.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed three original inference attacks
against federated learning. The attack target includes the
quantity composition proportion of training labels, a new
consideration in FL security. Specifically, Class Sniffing can
detect the existence of a particular label in a single training
round; Quantity Inference is able to determine how many
clients own a certain label from the perspective of a single
iteration; and finally, Whole Determination aims to infer
the quantity information among different labels for the whole
training process. All of them work in a passive way, and they
will not impose any influence to the whole FL structure, hence
it is difficult for the prevalent intrusion detection techniques
to detect our attacks. Besides, all three attacks do not require
the observation of any individual gradient updates from par-
ticipants, which enables the attackers to apply them in more
practical scenarios.
We have conducted extensive experiments that demonstrate
the effectiveness of our attacks, with evaluation settings as
practical as we can. All three attacks are shown to be very
effective, with their success rates staying at a relative high
level (typically around 95%). Moreover, we also investigated
the impact of major hyper-parameters, e.g., batch size, local
epochs and the overall number of participants. The results
demonstrate broad applicability of our approaches.
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